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Abstract
Addressing the equitable management of an international boundary river, this study aims to find the optimal strategy with 
regard to how to build multi-purpose dams and allocate the benefits and costs thereof. The interests of the riparian countries 
(North Korea and China) are defined in terms of the cooperative 2-person nonzero-sum game, and the Nash product is then 
calculated for various alternative strategies. The results reveal that the Kangkudong Dam and the Simpo Dam should be 
collaboratively constructed, and that the benefits of the 2 dams should be allocated according to relative demand in order to 
provide North Korea and China with sufficient benefits and to equitably address their conflicting interests. Furthermore, the 
suggested strategy was found to be optimal or at least quasi-optimal when the North Korean economy, which is regarded as 
a crucial source of uncertainty in this case, moved from a low-growth scenario to a high-growth scenario. 
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Introduction
The Tumen River passes through the international boundary 
between China, North Korea, and Russia, as depicted in  
Fig. 1. The river originates from a basaltic plateau, which 
surrounds Baekdu Mountain, with an altitude of 2 750 m, and 
then flows into the East Sea. The abundant water, which aver-
ages 6.8 billion m3/yr, has huge potential as a water resource 
as well as an electricity source for the riparian countries. As 
China, Russia, and South Korea have recognised the eco-
nomic value of developing the Tumen River, a joint team, 
comprising members from these nations and supported by 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), recently 
investigated the geographical and hydrological characteris-
tics of the river, as summarised in Table 1. As a result, the 
joint team recommended that 2 multi-purpose dams be con-
structed. The Kanggudong Dam and the Simpo Dam were 
estimated to enable a water supply of 845 million and 940 
millionm3/yr, and electricity supply of 350 and 275 GWh/yr, 
respectively (the plan is often referred to as the Tumen River 
Area Development Programme, hereafter simply referred 
to as TRADP). Furthermore, the river is known for its huge 
coefficient of river regime, i.e. the ratio between the maxi-
mum and minimum amount of flow, of 300. Owing to this fea-
ture of extreme seasonality, people in the riparian area have 
frequently suffered the consequences of floods and droughts. 
The 2 proposed dams are expected to effectively relieve these 
 
Figure 1
Location of the Tumen River basin
Table 1
Hydrologic characteristics of the Tumen River basin
Total watershed area 33 168 km China: 69.3%, North Korea: 30.3%, Russia: 0.3%
River length 516 km Upstream: 77.3 km, midstream: 256.8 km, downstream: 164 km
Slope 4.84% Upstream: 10.02 %, midstream: 1.65 %, downstream: 0.35 %
Average temperature 2-6°C Maximum: 36 ~ 38°C (summer), minimum: -40 ~ -35°C (winter)
Average precipitation 570 mm/yr 70% from June to September (rainy season)
Population Aprox. 2 million people China: aprox. 1.5 million; North Korea: aprox. 0.5 million
Data source: K-Water (2004)
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problems. Note that specific actions to implement this plan 
have yet to be taken.
Indeed, North Korea and China have on a number of occa-
sions attempted to develop water resource infrastructures in 
this river basin. At each occasion, however, they could not 
reach mutual agreement on the specified strategies (hereafter, 
the term strategy implies the definite course of action concern-
ing how the 2 dams should be built and how the benefits and 
the costs should be allocated). According to Kim (2002), China 
preferred building and operating each dam individually by 
mutual consent, whereas North Korea insisted upon building 
the dams collaboratively and allocating the benefits according 
to their contributions. In addition to this, as pointed out by Lee 
et al. (2008), planning the strategies is often hampered by the 
economic situation of North Korea, which has stagnated since 
the 1990s. To sum up the above arguments, more efforts should 
be made to resolve the conflicting interests between China and 
North Korea, and to reflect the economic situation of North 
Korea, in order to expedite the TRADP.
This study begins with the results of a preliminary inves-
tigation by a UNDP joint team (K-Water, 2004), and therefore 
takes it as given that the planned dams will effectively lead 
to improved urban living standards, will stimulate economic 
growth, raise agricultural productivity, and help manage 
droughts and floods in the river basin. Hence, the aim of this 
study is to recommend specified strategies for the TRADP. In 
order to do this, the TRADP case is defined as a cooperative 
2-person nonzero-sum game, with the following considera-
tions: First, it is assumed that the TRADP is only related to 
China and North Korea, not Russia. As shown in Table 1, 
the Russian territory accounts for merely 0.3 % of the total 
area of the river basin, and this part of Russia is also sparsely 
populated. As such, in comparison to the other 2 countries, 
Russia does not have significant interests in the Tumen River. 
Secondly, gains in a country are not always linked to losses in 
another country, considering the abundant water resources of 
the river. Thus, it seems more likely to be a nonzero-sum game. 
Thirdly, the possibilities are excluded where a country decides 
upon non-cooperative strategies to satisfy its urgent demands 
for water and electricity. It has been almost 20 years since the 
UNDP launched discussions on the TRADP. However, neither 
of the 2 countries has hastened to individually develop water 
resource infrastructure. This is not merely based on empirical 
findings that cooperative strategies offer larger benefits to all 
riparian countries than non-cooperative strategies. Rather, it is 
mainly because, on the basis of the border treaty, they have thus 
far realised that the Tumen River is common property. Despite 
the vast economic values of the river basin, both countries 
are concerned that conflict over river management will harm 
political relations and lead to a border dispute (K-Water, 2004). 
Furthermore, the economic feasibility of the TRADP was 
examined by Shim and Lee (2001), who contended that non-
cooperative strategies will yield negative outcomes where the 
2 countries do not have sufficient development funds to indi-
vidually invest in the undeveloped area. The study concluded 
that the TRADP is achievable only with cooperative strategies, 
which are advantageous for attracting external funds from 
international financial institutions or other northeast Asian 
countries (However, it should also be noted that people are not 
always willing to cooperate in using common-pool resources). 
Figure 2 depicts the general approach to identifying the 
optimal strategy for the TRADP. Based on current discus-
sions on the TRADP and on socio-economic indicators of the 
river basin, water and electricity demands are predicted up 
to the year 2050 (Step B). Thereafter, possible strategies to 
implement the 2 dam projects are presented (Step C). The final 
choice among the cooperative strategies will affect benefit and 
cost allocations, and thus the 2 countries’ payoffs. For every 
strategy, hence, payoffs are calculated, based on water and 
electricity demands as well as the way that the relevant strategy 
allocates resources (Step D). The Nash bargaining solution, the 
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section, is used to decide upon the strategy, adjusting the 
interests of the 2 countries in an equitable manner (Step E). The 
selected strategy cannot be said to always be optimal for the 
TRADP, because the estimation does not take into account that 
the future of the North Korean economy is known to be highly 
uncertain, and because some data are inevitably assumed as 
being identical for the 2 countries. The sensitivities of the opti-
mal strategy are therefore tested over a wide range of growth 
rates of the North Korean economy (Step F) and over a wide 
range of the assumed data (Step G).
This study does not focus on pursuing a methodological 
contribution. During the past few decades, many researchers 
have tried to mediate conflicts originating from ill-defined 
water rights in boundary or transboundary river basins. Some 
proved conclusively that game theory is useful to define con-
flicting interests between riparian areas, and also derived 
optimal solutions. Instead, the aim of this study is to contribute 
to more practical application. First, the game model is applied 
to special cases where data are not sufficient. Despite having an 
urgent need to further develop water resource infrastructure, 
North Korea is rarely discussed in the scientific community in 
this regard, and thus this study should help to shed light on the 
complicated situation surrounding water resources in North 
Korea. Secondly, this study attempts to address the uncertainty 
in the North Korean economy before suggesting the optimal 
strategy for the TRADP. Addressing uncertainty as such is 
imperative when planning in any country where there is a 
probability that the national economy may fluctuate violently, 
and where the economic situation affects water or electricity 
demand, and ultimately the benefits from the water resource 
projects. Thirdly, this study illustratively shows that the opti-
mal solution, which offers satisfactory benefits to both riparian 
countries, is indeed collaborative in nature. This can be another 
lesson on how to deal with conflicting interests due to shared 
water resources.
Cooperative 2-person nonzero-sum game
Applications of game theory to shared water 
resource management
Since Von Neumann and Morgenstern published the book 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944), game theory has been recognised and 
used as a quantitative and rigorous method to predict strategic 
behaviours of economically rational players. With respect to 
improving water resource management, its applications are 
vast, differing from areas of conflict to identifying the kinds of 
available strategies. Meanwhile, water resource management 
scholars who have previously applied game theory commonly 
noted its potential as a unique systems method that is read-
ily applicable to problems that conventional systems methods 
cannot solve (Madani, 2010). The prevailing methods in water 
resource planning and management, for example, mathematical 
programming, specialise in deriving solutions for mechanical 
or machine-like systems. When confronted with system fail-
ures or system design problems, system boundaries and objec-
tive functions of the whole system are first postulated. It is then 
expected that all the parts within the boundaries will interact 
together such that the defined objective functions are maxim-
ised. However, in handling many water resource problems, 
and especially with growing interest in the integrated water 
resource management principle, parts of the system are often 
decision-makers or ‘players’, i.e. individuals or organisations 
who decide upon strategies to achieve self-interests. The con-
ventional system method, as described above, forces optimisa-
tion of the whole system on the players. If any of the players 
are unwilling to contribute to the whole system, the optimised 
outcomes cannot help to settle real water resource problems. 
Such cases are easily found in workshops or public hearings. In 
contrast, game theory focuses heavily on the rationality of an 
individual player or grouped players (it is generally accepted 
that a strategy is rational when a player chooses the best strat-
egy according to their preferences), not on the objectives of the 
whole system. The levels at which all objectives are achieved 
result from the set of all strategies. It thus leads to realistic 
insights about why the players are willing or unwilling to 
contribute to the whole system, what strategies the players will 
select to attain larger interests under situations of competition 
or negotiation, and sometimes how the rules of the game should 
be improved to accomplish the objectives of the whole system 
(Madani, 2010).
The game theory is classified chiefly depending on whether 
a game is viewed as non-cooperative or cooperative. A non-
cooperative game is used to predict or evaluate the strategies of 
players who, under strong competition, can gain more payoffs 
by cheating other players. Consequently, these games end in 
all players’ failures, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, or a 
large loss to players who are not familiar with the competi-
tion situation, as in the Chicken game. When water resources 
management conflicts are treated as non-cooperative games 
(for the state-of-art, see Carraro et al. (2005)), the following 
is generally illustrated: water resource users select strategies 
maximising their urgent self-interests, for example, a pumping 
rate exceeding agreements previously made to maintain the 
groundwater table; the set of those strategies causes the shared 
water resources to be seriously depleted or deteriorated; and, 
eventually, the benefits from water resources cease or become 
extremely restricted to all users. In order to avoid such nega-
tive situations, it is suggested that third party organisations 
and binding regulations be established, which play an impor-
tant role in punishing water resource users for violation of the 
agreement.
The cooperative game theory is used to handle the strate-
gies of players who are very likely to collaborate rather than 
compete with each other. The collaboration is justified when 
players gain more payoffs by devising a cooperative strategy or 
acting as a coalition. Even in these games conflicts can arise, 
because the cooperative strategies do not always allocate the 
same payoffs among the players. When water resource manage-
ment conflicts are treated as cooperative games (for the state-
of-art, see Parrachino et al. (2006)), it is generally illustrated 
that cooperation is impeded as long as water resource users 
adhere to strategies for self-interest. To advance cooperation, 
water resource users should reach mutual agreement upon the 
Pareto-efficient strategy.
Since the TRADP case is treated as a cooperative game, 
it is necessary to note other cases in which the cooperative 
game theory was applied in shared water resources manage-
ment. Netanyahu et al. (1998) examined the water resource 
allocation of the Mountain Aquifer between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Based on the projection that the aquifer 
would be threatened by over-pumping and degradation unless 
the 2 countries cooperated, the Mountain Aquifer case was 
defined as a cooperative game. The authors then used the Nash 
bargaining solution in analysing mutual interests served by 
the various strategies. As a result, it was concluded that Israel, 
the sole manager at that time, should cooperate with Palestine 
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in managing the aquifer, and the cooperative strategy was 
anticipated to be robust. Frisvold and Caswell (2000) tackled 
the allocation problem of the costs and benefits involved in 
pollution control projects in the Colorado River. Based on 
the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) 
framework ensuring binding commitments between Mexico 
and the USA, the Colorado River case was defined as a coop-
erative game. By means of the Nash bargaining solution, the 
case demonstrated how the costs and benefits should be allo-
cated between the 2 countries, and why the equal cost-sharing 
rule was an obstruction to their cooperation. Recently, Choi 
and Lee (2008) examined the Imnam Dam project in the Imjin 
River flowing from North Korea into South Korea. Similarly, 
the Nash bargaining solution revealed that cooperation of the 
2 countries could be sustained if North Korea guaranteed 50% 
of the total flow to South Korea, and South Korea compensated 
the North with a joint aggregate harvest project.
Water resource conflicts have been addressed by the coop-
erative game theory, rather than the non-cooperative game 
theory. This is mainly due to the existence of large economies 
of scale, owing to which water users prefer construction and 
operation of large-sized water resource infrastructures, and 
also because water resource usage often uncovers reciprocal 
externalities (Parrachino et al., 2006). It is thus easy to find that 
cooperative strategies dominate non-cooperative strategies, 
and there are strong incentives to cooperate in resolving water 
resource management conflicts (Becker and Easter, 1999). As a 
well-known case, Rogers (1969) applied game theory to devise 
a water resource project in a downstream region of the Ganges 
River, along the border between India and Pakistan. To deal 
with water issues related to the growing demands of hydroelec-
tricity and water resources, as well as flood control, the study 
presented 6 strategies, where one was the status quo, three were 
non-cooperative, and two were cooperative. After examining 
the net benefits from the 6 strategies, the study proved that 
unless a joint project was cooperatively developed, the benefits 
to the 2 countries would be far from the Pareto efficiency.
Nash bargaining solution for the TRADP 
Previous studies provide 2 important insights into the TRADP 
case. First, it is expected that this case can be effectively 
analysed with the Nash bargaining solution from the viewpoint 
of the cooperative game. This case is very similar to the cost 
allocation problem presented in Frisvold and Caswell (2000). 
As with Mexico and the USA, who are bound together by the 
IBWC framework, China and North Korea are very unlikely 
to act separately in developing the river basin, in light of the 
aforementioned institutional, political, and economic situation. 
Furthermore, the 2 countries have continuously shown a type 
of sequential bargaining game. Although the UNDP strived 
to advance the project, China and North Korea have simply 
exchanged proposals, and very slow progress has been made 
over the past 20 years. Keeping in mind that UNDP aid and 
other external finance is inevitable for the project, it seems 
likely that the delays in resolving the conflict decrease oppor-
tunities to use external funds. Regarding this, Binmore et al. 
(1986) theoretically proved that the Nash bargaining solution 
approximates the outcomes of the sequential bargaining game 
well. Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution appears to pro-
vide the TRADP with appropriate cooperative game concepts. 
Secondly, it is ascertained that the model for the bargain-
ing solution needs to be further unpacked to consider uncer-
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Imnam Dam project and the aggregate harvest project to be 
certain. However, the North Korean economy is relatively 
unstable, which can affect the demands for water resources 
and aggregates (Park and Lee, 2005; Park et al., 2005). The 
validity of the assumption for these benefits thus seems doubt-
ful. Likewise, it is anticipated that in the TRADP case large 
uncertainties will be propagated through the North Korean 
economy. As an effort to handle the uncertainties, it is possible 
to consider 2 scenarios, i.e. a low-growth scenario (LGS) and a 
high-growth scenario (HGS), according to the recent prospects 
for the North Korean economy. Subsequently, the scenarios are 
endowed with probabilities so that the Nash bargaining solution 
can reveal how the North Korean economy alters the optimal 
strategy. 
The model employed for the Nash bargaining game is 
briefly explained here. For the cooperative game, the Nash 
bargaining solution (1953) represents an axiomatic unique 
allocation between 2 players, in particular because ‘the alloca-
tion is feasible, fulfils individual rationality, is Pareto optimal, 
symmetric, not related to non-relevant alternatives and to a 
specific presentation of the von-Neumann Morgensten utility 
function (Dinar, 2001 p. 478).’ In addition to conceptual rich-
ness, the Nash bargaining solution requires a clear description 
and simple calculation. That is, the cooperative strategy of 2 
players is optimal when the Nash Product, N, is maximised as 
follows (the Nash bargaining solution was later generalised for 
n players with n > 2 by Harsanyi (1959; 1963): Similarly, the 
Pareto optimal strategy maximises the product
                                     (1)
where: 
ui is the payoff that player i derives from cooperation, and 
ui
0 is the payoff of player i that reflects the status quo (it is 
assumed that i = 1 for North Korea and i = 2 for China). 
The term payoff is a description used in economics; hereafter 
the more familiar term ‘net economic benefits’ will be used 
instead of ‘payoff’. Because neither of the 2 dams will be con-
structed before cooperation, ui
0  is regarded as zero. 
To calculate the net benefits to the ith country, the total 
benefits and the total costs were presumed as follows: it was 
roughly assumed that the total benefits arise from supplies of 
water resources ƒi1 and electricity ƒi2 to each respective country, 
and profits from water trade ƒi5 or electricity trade ƒi6; the total 
costs also include dam construction cost ƒi3, dam maintenance 
cost ƒi4, and expenses of water trade ƒi5 or electricity trade ƒi6.  
If ƒi5 and ƒi6 have negative values when the country exports 
water resources or electricity to another country, the net ben-
efits of the ith country are thus,
              (2)
Each function in Eq. (2) can be simply described, as follows:
              (3)
where: 
Si  t
w and Si  t
e  are the total amounts of water resources (m3/yr) 
and electricity (kWh/yr) that the 2 dams actually supply 
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to the ith country in the year t (i.e. produced amounts − 
exported amounts + imported amounts); 
Wi 
w and Wi 
e  are the willingness to pay for water resources 
(USD/m3) and electricity (USD/kWh); 
Pi 
w and Pi 
e denote the market price of water resources (USD/




and Bi  t
e are the traded amount of water resources (m3/yr) 
and electricity (kWh/yr) in the year t, and are set at negative 
values when the ith country is the exporter, in the same way 
as ƒi5 and ƒi6∙ 
Ci 
d  and Ci 
m  denote the construction cost (USD) and mainte-
nance cost (USD/yr); 
ri, T1, T2, and T3 are, respectively, the discount rate (%), 
the base year, the operation year, and the last year in time 
horizon (years), which are all needed to calculate all costs 
and all benefits in the monetary value of T1. 
If the market price closely reflects the real benefits of each 
service, Eq. (2) can be simplified as:
                 
                 
Furthermore, let us assume that p is the LGS probability, and 
uij is the net benefit of i
th country under the jth scenario ( j = 
1for the LGS, and 2 for the HGS). From Eq.(1) and Eq.(4), the 
expected value of the Nash product can be defined again, as:
                 (5)
where 
Most variables in Eq. (5) largely depend on the way the 2 dams 
are constructed and operated as well as on service demands. 
Data
The data applied to Eq. (5) were calculated, inferred, or 
assumed in some instances, as follows: 
• Time parameters (Table 2[1]): The base year T1 was set at 2010, meaning that the net benefits were converted to mon-
etary values for the year 2010. The proposed dams were 
also regarded as being operated from the year 2020, under 
the supposition that it will take at least 10 years for negotia-
tions, preliminary investigations, design, and construction. 
The last year in the time horizon T3 was set to be 2050, 
taking into account that water resource infrastructures 
are typically endowed with life-spans of approximately 30 
years. The discount rates were also considered as 3.24% for 
China and 2.96% for North Korea, as stated by the Bank of 
Korea.
• Scenarios for the North Korean economy (Table 2[2]): 
based on the predictions of Jung et al. (2001), the LGS and 
the HGS were regarded as having economic growth rates of 
6.67%/yr and 10.70%/yr, respectively
• Unit cost and unit benefit (Table 2[3]): it is speculated that 
the 2 countries will not make some data available and that 
they do not officially calculate some other necessary data. 
Alternatively, it was commonly assumed that the construc-
tion cost is 0.274 USD/m3, the annual maintenance cost is 
1% of the construction cost, and market prices are 0.587 
USD/m3 for water service and 6.43×10-2 USD/kWh for elec-
tricity service, based on dam design standards and market 
information for South Korea (Korea Energy Economics 
Institute, 2007; Yun, 2003). The assumption that the 2 
countries have the same unit cost and unit benefit is not eas-
ily accepted, and thus sensitivity tests are later conducted 
concerning the cases where unit cost and unit benefit for 
North Korea are not equal to those of China.
• Water and electricity supply capacity of the 2 proposed 
dams (Table 2[4]): according to the work by the UNDP 
joint team (K-Water, 2004), it was presumed that the total 
water supply capacity is 845 + 940 = 1 785 million m3/yr, 
whereas the total electricity supply capacity is 350 + 275 = 
625 GWh/yr.
• Water demand (Table 3): because North Korea has not 
officially calculated water consumption in recent years, it 
is impossible to use typical econometric models to estimate 
water demand. This study thus utilises the trend curves of 
Park et al. (2005), who inferred the water demand of North 
Korea until 2020, after having analysed water intake data 
announced before the 1990s and then having adjusted the 
data through interviews and questionnaire surveys with 
more than 100 refugees. The trend curves were classified 
Table 2
Data used to estimate the net benefits
Notation Unit Data Explanation
Base year of the time horizon T1 year 2010 [1]
Operation year T2 year 2021
Last year of the time horizon T3 year 2050
Discount rate of North Korea r1 % 2.96
Discount rate of China r2 % 3.24
Economic growth rate of North Korea GR %/yr 6.67 (for LGS) and 10.70 (for HGS) [2]
Unit construction cost kd USD/m3 0.274 [3]
Unit maintenance cost km USD/m3/yr 2.74×10-3
Market price of water service Pw USD/m3 0.587
Market price of electricity service Pe USD/kWh 6.43×10-2
Total water supply capacity of 2 proposed dams QwT  106 m3/yr 1 785 [4]
Water supply capacity of the Kanggudong Dam Qwk  106 m3/yr 845
Water supply capacity of the Simpo Dam Qws 106 m3/yr 940
Total electricity supply capacity of 2 proposed dams QeT GWh/yr 625
Electricity supply capacity of the Kanggudong Dam Qek GWh/year 350
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into residential demand, industrial demand, or agricultural 
demand, which significantly change according to patterns 
such as population (for residential demand), land use (for 
industrial and agricultural demands), and economic growth 
rate (for industrial demand). When the trend curves were 
applied to the Tumen River basin and then extended to 
cover the period from 2020 to 2050, it was projected that: 
 _ The residential demand will increase constantly from 
29.7 million m3/yr in 2020 to 48.7 million m3/yr in 2050
 _ The agricultural demand will be constant at 255 million 
m3/yr, because the area of farmland was expected to 
follow an invariant pattern
 _ The industrial demand will reach 717 million m3/yr or 2 
912 million m3/yr, depending on whether the LGS or the 
HGS occurs in reality. The results seem to be reason-
able, given that the river basin not only contains large-
scale industrial complexes, such as the Musan mine and 
the Hoeryong paper factory, but also adjoins the Najin-
Sunbong special economic zone. 
• For China, there are more reliable data available to pre-
dict water demand. Among available data, data from the 
US Department of Commerce (2005), National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2009), and K-Water (2004) were used to 
develop trend curves. It was projected that: 
 _ The residential demand will increase constantly from 
41 million in 2020 to 86 million m3/yr in 2050
 _ The agricultural demand will decrease slightly to 1 619 
million m3/yr in 2050
 _ The industrial demand will eventually increase to 
higher than 3 400 million m3/yr, largely due to the 
Hunchun development plan (Sim and Lee, 2001), a 
large-scale master-plan including the economic coop-
eration zone and the relevant infrastructures. 
North Korea and China were found to have current water supply 
capacity of 16 million and 673 million m3/yr in the river basin, 
respectively. If there are no other plans to expand water supply 
capacity in the river basin, water demand for the proposed dams 
can be regarded as the difference between the total demand and 
the existing supply capacity (for example, the amount of water 
that China requires from the 2 reservoirs in the year 2050 is  
86 + 1 619 + 3 416 – 673 = 4 448 million m3/yr).
Electricity demand (Table 4): for North Korea, Jung et al. 
(2001) calculated the existing electricity supply capability and 
predicted the long-term trend curves of demand, which was 
also considered to depend on population and the economic 
growth rate. When data for the river basin were applied to 
the trend curves, it was projected that the additional demand 
will be small in 2020, because the existing supply capacity 
can almost cover the total electricity demand, but the demand 
will grow exponentially and reach 336 or 401 GWh/yr in 2050 
depending on the scenarios. For China, many experts (e.g. Lee, 
2003; Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2008) pointed out 
that the growth rate of demand has been dampened since 2006, 
and the current supply capacity is sufficient to meet the demand 
into the distant future. In this regard, it was assumed that China 
will not have electricity demand for the proposed dams.
Strategies for the TRADP
To sum up the results presented in Tables 3 and 4, water 
demand is urgent to both countries, but generating electricity 
is meaningful only to North Korea. For equitable management 
of the TRADP, 8 cooperative strategies were examined and are 
presented in Fig. 3:
• Protection of water rights: these strategies imply that one 
country develops both dams and then provides the other 
country with electricity or a certain amount of water in 
light of permitting water rights. Strategy 1 is the case 
where China develops both dams, and passes the exclusive 
right to all electricity over to North Korea. For China, there 
will be no electricity demand, yet there will be higher water 
demand than the total supply capacity in the long run. 
Therefore, Fig. 3(a) shows that Strategy 1 does not include 
any trade. In contrast, Strategy 2 is the case where North 
Korea develops both dams, and passes the exclusive right to 
50% of available water resources over to China. As water 
demand for North Korea is predicted to reach less than half 
of the total water supply capacity in 2050, the 2 countries 
can increase the mutual benefits by trading water resources 
from North Korea to China. Hence, Strategy 2 involves 
water trade, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
•  Individual dam construction: these strategies are that each 
country constructs a dam individually, and then trades 
surplus water or electricity to increase the benefits to itself. 
Strategy 3 assumes that North Korea and China individu-
ally develop the Kanggudong Dam and the Simpo Dam, 
and Strategy 4 presents the opposite case. For both strate-
gies, there are opportunities to increase the benefits by 
making use of the unused supply capacity of each coun-
try. That is, China exports electricity while North Korea 
exports water resources, as depicted in Figs. 3(c) and (d).
• Individual dam construction by support from South Korea: 
Strategies 5 and 6 are similar to Strategies 3 and 4, respec-
tively, except that South Korea supports construction costs 
for North Korea. These strategies were added to assess the 
suitability of participation of South Korea, which is very 
interested in the water resource project of North Korea, 
Table 3
Water demand for the proposed dams (million m3/yr)
Country Notation 2020 2030 2040 2050
North Korea LGS  D11
w
 t 563.9 777.6 1 103.6 1 004.7
HGS  D12
w
 t 687.6 1 288.5 2 635.6 3 200.6
China D2 1
w
 t    = D2  2
w






Electricity demand for the proposed dams (GWh/yr)
Country Notation 2020 2030 2040 2050
North Korea LGS  D1 1
e
t 0 25.8 130.4 336.4
HGS  D12
e
 t 17.1 107.8 246.2 401.1
China D2 1
e
t    = D2  2
e
 t        0 0 0 0
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from both a humanitarian and strategic standpoint. These 
strategies differ from Strategies 3 and 4, in that they do 
not require that North Korea bears any initial construc-
tion costs. The requirement for China and North Korea to 
respectively export electricity and water resources, as in 
Figs. 3(e) and (f), is unchanged.
• Collaborative dam construction: Strategy 7 implies that 
the 2 countries collaboratively construct 2 dams with each 
country paying 50% of the costs. North Korea can be pro-
vided with all available electricity, and with an upper limit 
of 50% of available water resources (since it was previously 
anticipated that the water demand of North Korea would 
not be overly large in the near future). Instead, China can 
be supplied with a large amount of water from the begin-
ning. For an agreement on this strategy, China has no right 
to electricity and North Korea has a right to water resources 
corresponding to its demand. Therefore, Strategy 7 does 
not involve any trade, as shown in Fig.3g. For Strategy 8, 
the 2 dams are collaboratively built with North Korea pay-
ing 100α% and China 100(1−α)% of the costs, the produced 
water and electricity being allocated according to contribu-
tion α, and each country then trading surplus water and 
 
  
(a) Strategy 1 (b) Strategy 2 
  
(c) Strategy 3 (d) Strategy 4 
 
(e) Strategy 5 (f) Strategy 6 
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electricity. If the 2 countries agree on Strategy 8, the rights 
to water and electricity are proportional to the contribution 
that each country makes toward developing the 2 dams. 
Therefore, while comparing unused supply capacities (i.e. 
exclusive rights – their own demands) and unsatisfied 
demands of the other country, the 2 countries are expected 
to trade water resources and electricity so as to further 
increase their benefits, as depicted in Fig. 3(h). 
Results
Table 5 shows the benefits allocated to the riparian countries 
according to each strategy. Most conspicuous is that the sum 
of the net benefits of the 2 countries, i.e. u11 + u21 or u12 + u22, 
is roughly constant at around 14 billion USD irrespective of 
which strategy is chosen. In other words, for the economics of 
the entire river basin, it is not critical which of the 8 strategies 
is selected. However, it was found that individual net benefits 
vary across the strategies: under the conditions of the LGS for 
North Korea, 0.1≤u11≤13.6 and −4.7≤u21≤14.0; under the condi-
tions of the HGS, 0.2≤u12≤13.7 and −1.0≤u21≤14.0. This reveals 
that the choice made among the 8 cooperative strategies can 
cause serious inequity in the benefits that the TRADP offers to 
each country. For example, if Strategy 1 is selected, the sum of 
the net benefits, 14.1 or 14.2 billion USD, is not relatively small. 
However, the benefit to North Korea is less than 1% of the ben-
efit to China: i.e. u11/u21<0.01 and u12/u22<0.01. It is, therefore, 
anticipated that if China proposes Strategy 1, North Korea can-
not accept it, and their cooperation will be perpetually delayed.
Contrary to the sum of the benefits, the Nash product is 
known to present the strategy that can optimally lead to col-
laboration and simultaneously result in large benefits to both 
countries. Let us first suppose that the possibility of each sce-
nario is 50% (p = 0.5), which implies that the economic growth 
rate of North Korea will be the median between 6.67 and 10.7 
%. As summarised in Table 6, the Nash product shows that 
Strategy 7, i.e. constructing 2 dams collaboratively and allocat-
ing the benefits according to demand, is optimal in adjusting 
the interests of the 2 countries for the TRADP. In this case, the 
expected benefits to North Korea are u1= 0.5 x 6.7 + (1−0.5) x 
7.9 = 6.8 billion USD while those to China amount to u2 = 0.5 x 7.9 + (1−0.5) x 7.2 = 7.6 billion USD. It should also be noted 
that the benefit to North Korea reaches 90% of that to China, 
and Strategy 7 simultaneously guarantees relatively large ben-
efits to both countries. 
Furthermore, the Nash product was calculated over the 
full range of LGS possibilities (0≤p≤1). As shown in Table 
7, Strategy 7 was estimated to be at least quasi-optimal even 
when the North Korean economy is close to the high growth 
scenario (0≤p≤0.1). 
Discussion
Kim (2002) and K-Water (2004) noted that North Korea wanted 
to construct the dams through a joint project, and then allocate 
the benefits according to investment costs, whereas China 
wished to construct the dams individually under mutual agree-
ment. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to consider that Strategy 
8 speaks for the preference of North Korea while Strategy 3 or 
4 speaks for that of China. Table 5 offers a chance to interpret 
these preferences. If Strategy 8 is implemented as North Korea 
insists, North Korea can obtain maximum benefits of about 13.7 
billion USD for 30 years, which exceeds that yielded by the 
other strategies; in this case, however, the costs borne by China 
Table 5
Net benefits to both countries for each strategy (unit: billion USD/30 yr)
Net benefits Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 6 Strategy 7
u11 0.1 7.4 7.2 8.0 7.3 8.2 6.7
u12 0.2 7.4 7.2 8.0 7.4 8.2 7.5
u12 14.0 6.4 6.8 5.6 6.8 5.6 7.9
u22 14.0 7.1 7.3 6.4 7.3 6.4 7.2
Net benefits Strategy 8
α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9
u11 1.5 3.0 4.6 6.1 7.6 9.1 10.6 12.1 13.6
u12 1.5 3.0 4.6 6.1 7.6 9.2 10.7 12.2 13.7
u12 12.7 11.3 9.9 8.3 6.2 3.8 1.0 -1.8 -4.7
u22 12.8 11.3 9.9 8.5 6.9 5.1 3.2 1.1 -1.0
Table 6
Estimated values of the Nash product (p = 0.5))
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 6 Strategy 7
N (1018 ) 1.6 49.9 50.9 48.1 52.0 49.2 53.3
Strategy 8
α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.6 α = 0.7 α = 0.8 α = 0.9
N (1018 ) 18.7 34.2 45.1 50.9 49.8 40.7 22.3 -4.2 -38.8
Table 7
The maximum Nash solution according to various probabilities of scenarios
The LGS possibility Optimal strategy Second strategy
0≤p≤0.1 Strategy 5 Strategy 7
0.1≤p≤0.8 Strategy 7 Strategy 5
0.8≤p≤1.0 Strategy 7 Strategy 10 at α = 0.4
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outweigh the benefits. North Korea is thus regarded as a rational 
economic agent trying to maximise its benefits under the gam-
ing situation. On the contrary, if Strategy 3 or 4 is implemented, 
as China wishes, China is expected to obtain benefits of 5.6 to 
7.3 billion USD for 30 years, or no more than half of the benefits 
from Strategy 1. Meanwhile, the benefit obtained by North Korea 
ranges from 7.2 to 8.0 billion USD for the same period, mean-
ing that the benefits to North Korea can be moderately satisfied, 
compared to the yields of other strategies. Therefore, China is 
not viewed as a rational economic agent, because it does not 
exert effort to maximise its own benefits. The authors speculate 
that this can be attributed to China’s greater enthusiasm for the 
TRADP due to urgent water demand. 
This study finally considers Strategy 7 to be appropriate for 
the TRADP. Firstly, Strategy 7 can optimally adjust the interests 
of North Korea and China under most conditions, including that 
in which the North Korean economy changes from the LGS to 
the HGS. Indeed, Strategy 5, which means that North Korea 
develops the Kanggudong Dam with financial aid from South 
Korea and China develops the Simpo Dam, was expected to be 
better than Strategy 7 if the North Korean economy approaches 
the HGS. However, Strategy 5 appears to be vulnerable to 
political conflicts. According to Park et al. (2005), North Korea 
is unwilling to accept direct aid from South Korea for water 
resource projects. Furthermore, if North Korea and China own 
the upstream dam and the downstream dam, respectively, a seri-
ous problem can occur in the dry season. Because North Korea 
does not have incentive to release the stored water to the down-
stream dam, Strategy 5 again leads to conflict over the trans-
boundary river. In this regard, it is concluded that the optimal 
strategy for the TRADP is to construct the proposed dam col-
laboratively and allocate the benefits according to the demands.
In this study, the same data for unit cost and unit benefit 
were applied to the 2 countries. Because this assumption is not 
generally accepted, it is necessary to assess whether the dif-
ferences in unit cost and unit benefit between the 2 countries 
will lead to different outcomes: i.e. sensitivity analyses must be 
performed. To this end, it was supposed that the market prices 
and the unit costs for China are a and b times those of North 
Korea, respectively, as follows:
   
           (6)
where: 
a is the ratio of market prices of water or electricity 
between North Korea and China, and 
b is the ratio of construction costs or maintenance costs 
between North Korea and China. 
As a and b changed along a range of 0.5 to 2.0, the Nash prod-
uct was calculated again. These tests revealed that Strategy 7 
is still optimal or quasi-optimal over the various conditions 
of the North Korean economy in the given range of a and b. 
Therefore, the assumption that the 2 countries have the same 
unit cost and unit benefit was found not to significantly affect 
the conclusion.
Conclusion
This study sought to find the cooperative strategy for 2 multi-
purpose dams on the Tumen River, i.e., how the 2 dams should 
be built and how the benefits and the costs should be allocated. 
Although the riparian areas urgently require water resources 
and electricity, and often suffer from droughts and floods, 
appropriate action has not been undertaken because of conflict-
ing interests. In this light, their interests were regarded as part 
of a cooperative 2-person nonzero-sum game. After the net 
benefits were calculated over the various cooperative strate-
gies that the 2 countries had already suggested or that should 
be considered in promoting the project, it was found that the 
sum of the benefits to the 2 countries did not vary significantly 
between the strategies. More specially, the proposed dam pro-
jects will provide the whole river basin with benefits of roughly 
14 billion USD over 30 years, regardless of which strategy is 
selected. However, the benefits to each country are expected to 
vary from a negative value to around 14 billion USD, depend-
ing on selection of the strategy. This shows that a serious ineq-
uity in the benefits can arise if the strategy is improperly cho-
sen. After calculating the Nash Product, however, it was found 
to be possible to guarantee large benefits to both parties and to 
adjust the conflicting interests very well: i.e. if the Kangkudong 
Dam and the Simpo Dam are collaboratively constructed, and 
the benefits of the 2 dams are allocated according to related 
demand, North Korea and China are respectively expected to 
receive benefits of 6.8 billion and 7.6 billion USD. Moreover, 
it was ascertained that the suggested strategy was optimal or 
at least quasi-optimal when the North Korean economy varied 
from a low growth scenario to a high growth scenario (though 
noting that different results may be obtained if other coopera-
tive game theory solution concepts are used).
Finally, it should be noted that much of the data regarding 
North Korea were inferred or assumed, in the absence of offi-
cially documented data. Notwithstanding the limitations of the 
data, however, the results are thought to be meaningful. This is 
partly because the assumptions for unit costs and unit benefits 
were evaluated to be insignificant through sensitivity analyses, 
and mostly because decisions are inevitably made under highly 
uncertain conditions when any infrastructure project is in the 
planning stage, as is the case with the TRADP. 
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